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game. However, as NPOs strive at creating net value by aiming at a most ef-
fective mission-accomplishment, socially responsible and impact investments 
may offer a better way of doing so. We present NPOs as an ideal type of a so-
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Introduction 
Imagine a nonprofit organization (NPO) with the mission of helping people suffering 
from smoking-induced lung cancer. Now it might seem inappropriate for this organiza-
tion to invest any portion of its portfolio into tobacco companies. It might seem even 
more absurd and ethically unjustifiable for them to solely invest in these companies. Yet, 
based on typical financial hedging methodologies investing exclusively in companies 
diametrically opposed to the NPO’s mission might be the most effective way of invest-
ing. The idea is that such investments represent the perfect hedge: In times when tobacco 
companies operate profitable and are expanding, the problem the NPO is trying to solve 
must be growing as more people are smoking. But the value of the NPO’s portfolio will 
increase with tobacco companies being more profitable, providing the organization with 
more funds to pursue its mission. Conversely, if all tobacco companies go bankrupt be-
cause nobody is buying cigarettes anymore, the value of the NPO’s portfolio is zero. 
However, there are no more people smoking and thus suffering from smoking-induced 
lung cancer. 
It soon becomes clear, that there is a flaw in this logic – even if we assume there ex-
ists at least one company for every NPO that does the exact opposite of what the organi-
zation is trying to achieve. The logic is flawed as hedging by only holding sin stocks is at 
most a financial zero sum game. The ultimate goal of NPOs is the most effective mission 
accomplishment (see Oster, 1995; Moore, 2000; and Sawhill and Williamson, 2001) and 
therefore the creation of mission-specific net-value. In this article, we show that NPOs as 
mission-driven organizations (Sawhill and Williamson, 2001) must not evaluate their 
investments only with regard to their financial success and cash flows (which instrumen-
tally contributes to mission-accomplishment – see Young, Jung, and Aranson, 2010) but 
have to include their influence on mission and stakeholders. The full implementation of 
this logic will ultimately lead to an alignment of investment- and contribution-policy, 
usually referred to as mission investing (MI, see Cooch and Kramer, 2007; Emerson, 
2003; and Wood and Hagermann, 2010). Given our proposition and economic reasoning 
that NPOs should follow a mission-driven investment process, they represent an ideal-
type of a socially responsible and impact investor. Given this mission-orientation NPOs 
face multidimensional trade-offs when evaluating their effectiveness (see for instance 
Sowa, Coleman Selden, and Sandfort, 2004). This also applies to evaluating investments, 
where not only financial risk and return (as traditionally proposed by the capital asset 
pricing model – CAPM) but also a value-based impact1 should be included. Based on 
these ideas we introduce a formulation of these trade-offs. The analysis of this formula-
tion allows us to discuss consequences for the financial management of NPOs in contrast 
to regular “asset-only” optimizing investors. 
NPOs should profit from this analysis, as it enables them to evaluate their invest-
ments on a more accurate basis, given only the mission inclusion allows them to draw 
conclusions about whether an investment did help further the accomplishment of the or-
ganization’s superordinate goal. Further, the formalization of these additional trade-offs 
                                                 
1
 Grabenwarter and Liechtenstein (2011) propose the term “gamma” in the context of impact investments. 
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lays the foundation for empirical testing of possible co-movement of financial returns, 
risks, and mission-specific values. 
Research question 
The main aim of this article is to show if, why and how NPOs constitute an ideal type of 
a socially responsible and impact investor. This article, therefore, ultimately is about the 
evaluation of an investment strategy’s desirability (i.e., the utility an investor derives 
from a set of assets). In order to determine how NPOs should evaluate financial invest-
ments we assume a rather provocative position: For NPOs the exclusive investment into 
companies perfectly opposing its own mission (i.e., sin stocks) is most desirable, as it 
offers a perfect hedge of cash flows and spending. This article, therefore, first tries to 
answer the following: 
 How are sin stocks representing the most effective investment for mission-
driven organizations? 
In order to discuss this question, we need to identify the ultimate organizational goal 
NPOs are pursuing and how the achievement of such a goal should be measured. For a 
mission-driven organization the success of actions taken – including investment decisions 
– can only be effectively evaluated by taking its mission as ultimate point of reference. 
This includes performance as well as risk measurement. This inclusion, however, asks for 
the integration of mission-specific factors into common trade-offs of traditional financial 
market theory. We therefore must answer: 
 how this integration of mission-specific factors can be formulated, 
 how these multidimensional trade-offs should be empirically tested in the con-
text of the NPOs’ heterogeneous fields of activity, 
 and what consequences arise for NPOs as mission-driven investors. 
The answers derived from our theoretical analysis then allow us to identify how 
NPOs constitute socially responsible and impact investors and how they may contribute 
to the further establishment of value-oriented investment strategies. 
Relevance and Literature 
Value-oriented investment strategies are gaining momentum. Among these strategies are 
socially responsible investments (SRI) or more recently introduced the concept of impact 
investing. SRI, although an already well-established investment strategy, still lacks a 
unanimously agreed definition. Sandberg, Juravle, Hedesström, and Hamilton (2009) 
specifically addressed this problem in their article on the heterogeneity of SRI (including 
an excellent overview over the subject of SRI). This heterogeneity not only includes the 
definition of SRI but also its application on a strategic and practical level. Renneboog, 
Ter Horst, and Zhang (2008) and Derwall, Koedijk, and Ter Horst (2011) agreed (among 
others) that SRI generally stands for the inclusion of additional, non-monetary criteria 
into the process of financial decision-making. Very often, these criteria come in the form 
of the three ESG-factors (see Sandberg et al., 2009, who cite various sources defining 
SRI based upon ESG-integration). These factors combine measures for ecologic, social, 
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and governance-related (hence, ESG) performance and risk of companies. In contrast to 
SRI, impact investing is a rather “young” investment strategy. This strategy focuses more 
proactively on a positive social impact than SRI while still realizing financial returns. 
Most often this is achieved through instruments not traded in secondary markets (see for 
instance Thornley, Wood, Grace, and Sullivant, 2011; Wood, Thornley, and Grace, 2013; 
and J.P. Morgen and Global Impact Investing Network, 2014). Grabenwarter and Liech-
tenstein (2011, p. 10) define every profit-oriented investment activity as impact investing 
which “intentionally generates measurable benefits for society” and stress that the intend-
ed impact must be measured. Wood et al. (2013, p. 75) similarly subsume any “invest-
ment with the intent to create measurable social or environmental benefits in addition to 
financial return” as impact investing. In comparison to SRI, Oehri, Dreher, Jochum, and 
von Schnurbein (2013) understood impact investing as funding through direct invest-
ments rather than as a strategy that holds publicly traded shares. Impact investing there-
fore does not try to minimize negative effects, but specifically aims at creating positive 
impact. This is also supported by J.P. Morgan and The Rockefeller Foundation (2010) 
who defined impact investing as a more proactive strategy than SRI. Grabenwarter and 
Liechtenstein (2011) presented detailed case studies on how impact investing can be im-
plemented. 
The market volume for ESG-integrating investments in Europe alone has seen a 
growth of over 700% between 2005 and 2013 and is now estimated to total at 5.2 trillion 
EUR of invested assets (Eurosif A.I.S.B.L., 2014). The volume of impact investing has 
more than doubled since 2011 and is estimated to be at 20.3 billion EUR (ibid). In the US 
a similar growth can be observed; assets managed under ESG incorporation are currently 
valued at 6.2 trillion USD (US SIF Foundation, 2014), while there are no current num-
bers for the US-market volume of impact investments. 
Discussions about whether these investments are violating the fiduciary duties in the 
context of charitable foundations and NPOs, as they might be forgoing financial returns, 
are still ongoing. However, since the publication of the so called “Freshfields report” in 
2005 and its second version in 2009 (see Sandberg, 2011, for a discussion in the context 
of SRI) these types of investments have become more accepted and made their way into 
financial “mainstream”. NPOs as value- or mission-driven organizations may represent 
an ideal-type of a socially responsible or impact investor. Assets held by US NPOs alone 
(2.71 trillion USD – see Roeger, Blackwood, and Pettijohn, 2012) exceed the total assets 
under management of the world’s largest asset manager (UBS, with a total of 1.96 trillion 
USD
2
). NPOs may therefore play an important role in the future development and estab-
lishment of SRI and impact investing. 
Existing literature with regard to the implementation of MI (for an European over-
view see for instance Fritz and von Schnurbein, 2015; for US data see Lawrence and 
Mukai, 2011) points out the importance of impact measurement of investments, but does 
not supply any linkage between basic principles or theories from financial market theory 
and nonprofit management. Wood and Hagermann (2010), in their article about MI, 
stressed the need for future theoretical and empirical research. We aim at partially filling 
this gap by providing a way of combining standard mean-variance optimization with 
                                                 
2
 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5414e8dc-0cf3-11e4-bf1e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3FS12Gy8s 
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qualitative, mission-based factors, as similarly contemplated by Grabenwarter and Liech-
tenstein (2011) in the context of impact investing. This combination allows us to specifi-
cally show how NPOs differ from private investors in their way of evaluating the desira-
bility of financial investments and therefore have a different understanding of the terms 
risk and return. 
The Perfect Hedge? 
Introduced as our first research question and as a rather provocative proposition one may 
ask if it was not sensible and economically reasonable to aim for a co-movement of cash 
flows and necessary spending within an NPO – by investing into companies directly op-
posed to the organizations mission. How does that make sense? The principle of “hedg-
ing” in context of financial decision-making simply means to protect oneself or an organ-
ization against possible losses coming from current investments. A perfect hedge there-
fore generates maximum income when it is needed the most – it acts as insurance. Ap-
plied to NPOs the term “investment” may take two forms. Next to traditional financial 
investments, it also may take an unconventional “real” form: grants and donations aimed 
at fulfilling the organization’s purpose can also be perceived as investments. For instance, 
derived from its mission, an organization might focus on helping lung cancer patients. It 
therefore invests time and money into treating patients, supporting cancer research, and 
leading prevention campaigns. The “return” from these investments, however, is non-
financial: Patients receive better treatment and fewer people will get lung cancer or die 
from it. Now, if assuming there is an increasing number of smokers, there is a bigger 
need for such real investments. At the same time tobacco companies are selling more 
cigarettes and therefore operate more profitable. Therefore, a financial investment into 
tobacco companies might very well be sensible as it acts as a hedge for the NPO’s real 
investments into its purpose and mission. If the organization’s campaign is successful the 
number of smokers will decrease; the tobacco companies earn less, will pay lower divi-
dends, and share prices might drop. At the same time the number of smoking-induced 
cancer patients will decline as well, making fewer real investments necessary. The finan-
cial investment therefore displays a (perfect) negative co-movement with the organiza-
tion’s success. It therefore acts as insurance for needed cash flows. 
The same logic or mechanism is applicable to various fields of activity. However, 
there is a flaw to this logic. First of all, it would be necessary to find a company that ac-
tually almost perfectly opposes the organization’s specific mission, which is very hard to 
come by. Second and far more important, even if such a company exists for every NPO, 
financially the perfect hedge is at its best a zero-sum game. The money earned by harm-
ing its own cause is invested again into programs that undo the harm caused. This also 
requires the NPO to accrue no administrative costs while doing so. Even in the case of an 
NPO solely run by volunteers the opportunity costs of the volunteers would prevent this 
hedge from being a zero-sum game. Further, the financial investment into the opposed 
company does not only generate income for the NPO but also influences the companies’ 
cost of capital: Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) showed that there is a significant impact of 
shunning sin stocks on the cost of capital of such companies. The capital supplied there-
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fore actively supports a purpose that contradicts the NPO’s own. A charitable organiza-
tion’s tax-exempt status is only justified “as long as the organization’s resources are em-
ployed to cultivate its purpose constraint in a constructive, progressive, and tolerant fash-
ion” (Crimm, 1998, p. 483). Failing to meet these conditions due to the inappropriate 
usage of resource may result in a possible loss of the tax-exempt status and therefore pos-
es a financial risk to the NPO. 
So far, our analysis about whether sin stocks represent an optimal investment with 
regard to NPOs solely focusses on financial factors. However, when talking about the 
success of an NPO, financial means cannot describe the organization’s ultimate achieve-
ment of objectives. We will therefore look at how these goals should be measured before 
coming to a preliminary conclusion about the sense or nonsense of solely investing into 
sin stocks. 
Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs) 
Despite their name, the popular belief that nonprofit organizations are exempt from mak-
ing profit is not at all true. The word “nonprofit”, however, hints that the realization of 
financial profit is not the organization’s ultimate goal. But then what is? NPOs also strive 
at maximizing some kind of profit, but this profit takes on a different form. Valentinov 
(2008, p. 8) described an NPO as firm that orients itself toward “utility rather than profit 
maximization”. An NPO’s ultimate goal simply is the most effective mission accom-
plishment (see Oster, 1995, Moore, 2000, and Sawhill and Williamson, 2001) and there-
fore the creation of net-value, derived from its purpose. NPOs can therefore be perceived 
as “mission-driven” organizations (Sawhill and Williamson, 2001). Analog to regular for-
profit organizations (i.e., companies), every action taken within the organization should 
contribute to the achievement of the organization’s top goal and has to be measured by 
means that are compatible with said goal (see Schmiel, 2012). Although for-profits there-
fore judge investments by their contribution to maximizing net present value (NPV), in-
vestments within NPOs should be evaluated on the basis of their contribution to a most 
effective mission accomplishment. Thus the NPO becomes something we refer to as a 
“mission-driven investor”. This may still allow an NPO to fully invest into sin stocks. If 
the money earned from financial investments is used in such a manner that the purpose-
related utility created afterwards outweighs the harm done by supplying capital to com-
panies opposed to the organization’s purpose, there is actual net value created. However 
one might ask oneself, if it is most effective, when harm first has to be undone before 
actually realizing net value. Therefore, in order to get a holistic picture of the organiza-
tion’s created net value, it is vital to incorporate the organization’s mission into the eval-
uation of investments, as an ultimate point of reference. This mission-orientation is not 
exclusive to NPOs. In the context of asset-liability management, a similar way of compil-
ing an investment policy has been proposed for pension funds. These funds set the obli-
gation to their beneficiaries at the center of their investment policy (Berkelaar and 
Kouwenberg, 2010). Translated back to NPOs, the obligation to beneficiaries simply is 
the organization’s mission. We will propose a formalization of such incorporation for 
NPOs in the remainder of this article. This will then allow us, to actually determine 
which investment strategy offers the highest desirability with regard to the most effective 
mission accomplishment. 
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Multidimensional Trade-Offs 
As we try to capture the desirability of investment strategies for NPOs and the additional 
trade-offs which arise from the integration of mission-based goals into financial decision-
making, we propose a simple formulation which will serve as the foundation of our anal-
ysis and thus answering our second research question. We argue that in addition to the 
amount of invested assets held at the end of an investment period (It), the average of in-
vestments held over that period ((It-1+It)/2) should be weighed with a mission-related 
“impact factor”. In reference to Grabenwarter and Liechtenstein (2011), we denote this 
factor with γ. In their work, this factor acts as a multiplier based on the established impact 
objective of an investment project (>1 if objectives are exceeded, <1 if investments fall 
short of objectives). In our model, this multiplier is constructed slightly different. If the 
portfolio has no impact on the organization’s mission γ will simply be zero. It takes posi-
tive values depending on the positive impact in relation to the impact the organization 
generates with the money spent on projects. It is therefore a relative indicator of the ef-
fectiveness of the financial investments (measured by the organization’s mission) in 
comparison to the organization’s real investments. According to the same logic γ may 
also be negative, if the financial investments work against the organization’s real invest-
ments. The impact multiplier is therefore not bound to a specific interval and is a contin-
uous variable. 
Based on this assumption we show how future, uncertain developments of invest-
ments and the impact factor influence the perceived utility coming from investments. 
Given this formulation we aim at showing which parameters NPOs should focus on, 
when making mission-driven investment decisions in order to guarantee a most effective 
use of invested tax-exempt assets. 
Proposed model 
We acknowledge that an NPO as mission-driven organization cannot neglect the mission-
related impact of its investments (in order to fully capture the utility gained from invest-
ments). This leads us to the conclusion that an NPO’s perceived utility from investments 
stems from multiple sources. Firstly, the instrumental usage of assets (𝐼𝑡) (as source of 
funds for disbursements/programming) creates utility. The utility derived from these as-
sets is assumed to be equal to the monetary value and marginally non-diminishing. Sec-
ondly, the direct impact the investments have on the organization’s environment and rel-
evant stakeholders also affect the organizations perceived utility. This direct impact on 
mission accomplishment is expressed as a weighed arithmetic average of the assets held 
over a given period. We therefore introduce the impact multiplier γ that weighs this aver-
age sum of assets. The sum of this indirect and direct influence on total perceived utility 
from investments (𝑈𝐼,𝑡) is formalized in the Equation 1 and marks the first step in calcu-
lating the desirability of the chosen investment strategy as laid out in our second research 
question: 
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𝑈𝐼,𝑡 =  𝐼𝑡 +
𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡
2
 𝛾𝑡. (1) 
 
For the current period (t) this utility is assumed to be known. However, the next pe-
riod’s development of asset value as well as the impact of the investments is uncertain. 
We denote this uncertainty by adding a tilde to these factors: 
?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1 =   𝐼𝑡+1 +
𝐼𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡+1
2
 ?̃?𝑡+1. (2) 
 
When making investment decisions we are interested in the next period’s utility cre-
ated using today’s assets. We therefore simply divide the equation by the end of period 
value of today’s assets (𝐼𝑡): 
?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑡
=
𝐼𝑡+1
𝐼𝑡
+
𝐼𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡+1
2  ?̃?𝑡+1 
𝐼𝑡
. (3) 
 
Rewriting the expression 𝐼𝐼,𝑡+1/𝐼𝑡 as financial return (1 + ?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1) leads to the fol-
lowing form: 
𝑈𝐼,𝑡+1
𝐼𝑡
= (1 + ?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1) +  ?̃?𝑡+1 +  
?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1?̃?𝑡+1
2
. (4) 
 
To evaluate the desirability (𝑑) of the investor’s portfolio and ultimately create a 
mean-variance efficient portfolio the following equation should be maximized (see for 
instance Sharpe, 2007): 
𝑑 = 𝐸(?̃?) −  [
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̃?)
𝜏
], (5) 
 
where 𝐸( ) denotes the expected value, 𝑣𝑎𝑟( ) the variance, τ the investor’s risk 
tolerance and ?̃? contains all parts of the previous utility function from Equation 4 with 
uncertainty. In our model these uncertain parts are the following: 
?̃? = ?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1 + ?̃?𝑡+1 +  
?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1?̃?𝑡+1
2
 . (6) 
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Therefore, the expected value of ?̃? is: 
𝐸(𝑍) = 𝐸(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1) +  𝐸(?̃?𝑡+1) +
1
2
𝐸(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1?̃?𝑡+1) (7) 
 
and the variance of ?̃? as follows: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝑡+1) +
1
4
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1 ?̃?𝑡+1) +  2𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1, ?̃?𝑡+1)
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1, ?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1 ?̃?𝑡+1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝑡+1, ?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1 ?̃?𝑡+1). 
(8) 
 
Combining the parts from Equations 7 and 8 with consideration of risk tolerance 
therefore yields the expression in Equation 9, describing the portfolio’s desirability. This 
is the objective function which the investors ultimately tries to maximize by choosing an 
optimal set of assets: 
𝑑1 = 𝐸(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1) + 𝐸(?̃?𝑡+1) +  
1
2
 𝐸(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1)𝐸(?̃?𝑡+1) −  
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1)
𝜏
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
−  
1
4
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1 ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
− 2
𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1, ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
−
𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1, ?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1 ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
−
𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝑡+1, ?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1 ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
. 
(9) 
Analysis of Model 
Given the formalization of portfolio desirability under inclusion of the organization’s 
mission as a central point of reference in Equation 9, we can now move a step forward 
and compare the perception of desirability under two different optics: mission inclusion 
and “asset-only” optimization. When an NPO as mission-driven investor adopts an asset-
only optic when evaluating investment opportunities it commits an “estimation error”. 
Comparing expression 𝑑1 from Equation 9 with a simple asset-only optimization, which 
takes the subsequent form (see Sharpe, 2007): 
 
𝑑2 = 𝐸(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1) −
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1)
𝜏
, (10) 
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the size of the estimation error for a mission-driven investor becomes evident. This 
is simply done by subtracting Equation 10 from Equation 9: 
𝑑1 − 𝑑2 =  𝐸(?̃?𝑡+1) +  
1
2
 𝐸(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1)𝐸(?̃?𝑡+1) −
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
−
1
4
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1 ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
− 2
𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1, ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
−  
𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝑡+1,𝐼, ?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1 ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
−
𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝑡+1, ?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1 ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
. 
(11) 
The investor, therefore, underestimates the desirability of an investment by the ex-
pected value of the impact of his investment and half of the investment’s return times its 
impact (first and second expression in Equation 11). However, he also overestimates the 
desirability by the additional variance and covariance caused by including the additional 
impact factor divided by his own risk tolerance (third to last expression in Equation 11). 
Only when investing in a mission-neutral portfolio (meaning there is no positive or nega-
tive impact coming from the investments, hence γ = 0) the two ways of calculating the 
investment’s desirability yield the same. Such a mission-neutral portfolio could for in-
stance be used as a benchmark when ex-post evaluating the organization’s investment 
performance. 
In order to increase the desirability of any given investment portfolio a mission-
driven investor should not only aim at reducing the variance for a given rate of return 
(i.e., diversification) but also reduce the mission-related impact’s variance and maximiz-
ing its expected value. This may be achieved by setting minimum requirements for select-
ing investments (i.e., screening) with regard to the impact of the companies related to the 
organization’s mission. 
Coming back to our initial proposal that NPOs should solely invest in companies di-
rectly opposed to their mission, such a process of screening is actually applied, however 
in a rather extreme way. To conclude, if this strategy is actually reasonable, we now cal-
culate the estimation error as shown above in Equation 11. We assume the impact of the 
investments do not change over time, as it always diametrically opposes the organiza-
tion’s mission by construction. Therefore, γ is known, negative, and has a variance of 
zero. Adopting an “asset-only” optic, as done in the initial discussion, the desirability of 
the sin stock portfolio is therefore overestimated by the expected value of the invest-
ment’s impact (as it is negative) and half of the investment’s return times its impact 
(again, as γ is negative). Further, making γ a constant term eliminates the first and third 
covariance term from Equation 11, as the covariance of a variable with a constant is zero. 
The second covariance term becomes the simple variance of the return, times the invest-
ment’s impact, by which the desirability is actually underestimated. This can be seen in 
the Equation 12: 
𝑑1 − 𝑑2 =  𝛾𝑡+1 +
𝛾𝑡+1
2
𝐸(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1) −  
𝛾𝑡+1
2
4
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1)
𝜏
− 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝐼,𝑡+1)
𝜏
. (12) 
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We now assume values for the expected annual return (0.15) and variance (0.0625, 
i.e., standard deviation of 0.25) of the investment based on the performance of British 
American Tobacco in the past twenty years. For simplicity, the value of the organiza-
tion’s risk tolerance shall be 0.5. Entered into Equation 12 the investor overestimates the 
desirability from an asset-only point of view as soon as γ drops below zero (i.e., 𝑑1 <
𝑑2). This is true for every positive value of an investor’s risk tolerance. Given the sin-
stock strategy, γ is by construction negative. Thus, the mission-driven investor falsely 
overestimates the desirability of such a strategy. Further, the sin stock strategy only relies 
on maximizing the portfolio’s desirability through positively influencing financial in-
come and minimizing the variance of γ. The strategy therefore has another shortcoming 
as it does not exploit the full potential of increasing desirability by trying to positively 
influence γ while minimizing its variance. This is equal to choosing a portfolio on the 
efficient frontier but with a negative expected return. 
Thinking about the reverse case, where there is a constant positive purpose-related 
impact (γ > 0) and even with potentially much lower annual return rates and similar vari-
ance, the investor underestimates the desirability of the investment when adopting an 
asset-only optic.
3 
This means that applying common asset-only tools for evaluating in-
vestment strategies that should further the organization’s mission, such as SRI or impact 
investing (see Fritz and von Schnurbein, 2015), are being systematically underestimated 
in their desirability. 
Evaluation of desirability using a mission-neutral benchmark 
In order to be able to empirically test the consequences mission-inclusion has on the 
overall portfolio desirability and thus answering our third research question we will sub-
sequently introduce a way of doing so without restricting the model to certain fields of 
activity. This is important, as the NPO sector is very heterogeneous. The calculation of 
the desirability of a chosen strategy should be performed in comparison to a mission-
neutral strategy, which acts as a benchmark. This requires a similar formulation as shown 
in the calculation of the estimation error in Equation 11. However, the expected return on 
a mission-neutral portfolio (E(R̃n)) as well as its variance (Var(R̃n)) are different from 
E(R̃I) and (Var(R̃I)) and therefore do not cancel out: 
𝑑1 − 𝑑𝑛 =  𝐸(?̃?𝐼) − 𝐸(?̃?𝑛) + 𝐸(?̃?𝑡+1) +  
1
2
 𝐸(?̃?𝐼)𝐸(?̃?𝑡+1) −
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝐼)
𝜏
+
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝑛)
𝜏
−
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
−
1
4
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?𝐼 ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
− 2
𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝐼 , ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
− 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝐼 , ?̃?𝐼 ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
−
𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?𝑡+1, ?̃?𝐼 ?̃?𝑡+1)
𝜏
. 
(13) 
 
                                                 
3 Except for extremely high values of γ which are rather unrealistic. 
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For positive values of this difference, the chosen strategy is more desirable than a 
mission-neutral and vice versa. The compilation of such a mission-neutral portfolio is, 
depending on the organization’s field of activity, a difficult and often not exclusively 
objective task. Khan, Serafeim, and Yoon (2015) performed a similar analysis with re-
gard to the materiality of sustainability issues for companies: In order to analyze if sus-
tainability issues influence the company’s financial performance, they identified issues 
that were actually material for the company. Only including material factors into their 
analysis allowed showing significant outperformance. For the construction of a mission-
neutral benchmark the opposite task needs to be performed. All companies that are not 
“material” to their mission-accomplishment should be included, as they don’t influence 
the value of γ and hence leave it equal to zero. 
NPO as ideal type of a socially responsible or impact investor 
As we have just shown, in order to account for false estimations of desirability of invest-
ment opportunities, NPOs as mission-driven investors need to include further factors into 
financial decision-making than pure monetary terms. The integration of the mission as 
central point of reference into financial decision-making is referred to as mission invest-
ing (MI) – as long as a non-negative value for γ is aimed at. NPOs are far away from ap-
plying such an inclusion of non-monetary factors on a broad basis: According to Law-
rence and Mukai (2011), only 14% of US-foundations apply mission investing. Very of-
ten, the refusal of the application of MI is based on the assumption, that such strategies 
either pay lower return or display higher risks (see Fritz and von Schnurbein, 2015). This 
reasoning however adopts the wrong optic which leads, as just discussed, to an underes-
timation of desirability of such strategies. 
When looking for investment strategies that increase the desirability through posi-
tively manipulating the expected value of γ and reducing its variance, SRI and impact 
investing might be a viable option. As the realization of MI can be achieved through the 
application of both, SRI and impact investing (see for instance Fritz and von Schnurbein, 
2015) NPOs, as mission-driven investors, seem to present an ideal type of a socially re-
sponsible and or impact investor. We shall demonstrate this subsequently by linking the 
implications from our theoretical and mathematical analysis with findings in existing 
literature on both concepts. This will also allow us to answer our last research question by 
showing what consequences arise for NPOs as mission- or impact-driven investors when 
defining investment strategies. 
Socially Responsible Investments 
The initially discussed heterogeneity of SRI not only concerns its definition but also its 
strategic implementation. It is therefore not clear if SRI only aim at minimizing negative 
impact, or also strive at realizing positive impact. Either way, given a certain congruence 
of the NPO’s mission with the core principles of SRI, this strategy helps these organiza-
tions preventing their investments’ expected value of γ from becoming negative. This is 
mainly done through the implementation of negative or positive screening (Cowton and 
Sandberg, 2012), which is also a key instrument of MI (see Cooch and Kramer, 2007; and 
ACRN Oxford Journal of Finance and Risk Perspectives 
Special Issue of Social and Sustainable Finance, Vol.4 Issue 4, October 2015, p. 129-145 
ISSN 2305-7394 
 
141 
Viederman, 2002). Negative screening, the exclusion of certain companies or even indus-
tries or sectors from the portfolio, helps reducing the negative impact of the portfolio, 
therefore, increasing γ from a negative toward a positive value. If this strategy was to 
achieve a value of γ around zero it could even serve as the mission-neutral benchmark as 
proposed in Equation 13. Positive screening, the formulation of minimum standards with 
regard to certain criteria (e.g., ESG factors) aims at setting a minimum positive value for 
γ which first of all contributes at realizing a positive expected value and should also re-
duce the variance of the portfolio’s impact (see Equation 9). SRI are therefore a viable 
instrument for NPOs to positively influence their portfolios desirability. 
However, exclusionary instruments have also caused critique. Scholars like Hamil-
ton, Jo, and Statman (1993) and Fu and Shan (2009) mentioned the value-discounting 
hypothesis in the context of SRI. The hypothesis states that “SRI portfolios cannot out-
perform conventional portfolios because using a set of SRI criteria to screen securities 
imposes a constraint on the choice set of risk-return optimization, resulting in reduced 
diversification” (Fu and Shan, 2009, p.2). Even though several studies have shown, that 
SRI-funds need not underperform conventional portfolios (see for instance Renneboog et 
al., 2008; and the meta-analysis from Mercer LLC., 2009), if the value-discounting hy-
pothesis was true, the argument again is based on an asset-only optic. For NPOs as mis-
sion-driven investors, this may pose less of a problem than for regular investors, as the 
additional gained utility from the achieved impact, might outweigh this loss (i.e., if the 
first and second terms in Equation 11 are bigger than the sum of the third to last term). 
This makes NPOs even more an ideal-type of a socially responsible investor. 
Impact Investing 
Impact investing does not only try to minimize negative effects but also specifically aims 
at creating positive impact while stile generating financial returns. It may therefore be 
used by NPOs to increase their investment’s positive expected impact γ and minimize its 
variance, both increasing the portfolio’s desirability, ceteris paribus (see Equation 9). But 
as direct investments into specific projects or social enterprises are likely to increase the 
financial risk of the portfolio (𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝐼,𝑡+1)), these will also negatively influence desirabil-
ity. Careful selection of investment projects is therefore necessary to preserve the gained 
utility through the positive increase in γ. Depending on the organization’s specific pur-
pose or field of activity the bearing of such mission-specific risks, however, can also be 
seen as actually achieving more impact, thus again increasing γ. Crimm (1998) supported 
this argument independent of the concept of impact investing, as she states that NPOs 
deserve tax exemption, as they bear risks the market or state is not willing to. The tax 
exemption therefore acts as a risk-compensation, as derived from the classical theory of 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The exact trade-off between these monetary and 
non-monetary factors have to be analyzed on an organizational level, as NPOs are very 
heterogeneous with regard to fields of activity and their missions’ strategic interpretation. 
Wood et al. (2013, p. 78) specifically highlighted that under the application of tradi-
tional measures derived from modern portfolio theory (MPT) the “assessment of invest-
ment opportunities on a limited number of indicators (…) may constrain the incorpora-
tion of impact investing into investment decision-making.” This is precisely what our 
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formal analysis was able to proof. The adoption of an asset-only optic leads to a system-
atic misperception of desirability as shown in Equation 11. As NPOs (and private founda-
tions specifically) as mission-driven investors should not base their investment decision 
on an asset-only optic, they are an ideal type of impact investors, as also mentioned in 
Bugg-Levine and Goldstein (2009) and J.P. Morgan and The Rockefeller Foundation 
(2010). With regard to the evaluation of impact investing Jackson (2013) also mentioned 
that non-financial models such as the “theory of change” should be a core element, fur-
ther supporting the notion of the inclusion of non-monetary factors into financial deci-
sion-making for mission-driven investors. These elements typically are “input”, “output”, 
“outcome”, and “impact” and are also the key to impact measurement as laid out by Gra-
benwarter and Liechtenstein (2011). 
Impact investing can be perceived as a core strategy of MI, as stated by Fritz and 
von Schnurbein (2015) making NPOs (including private foundations) an ideal type of an 
impact investor. Although Wood et al. (2013) suggested the opposite logic, under which 
MI is presented as a practice of impact investing these logics are not in contradiction. 
They simply depend on the analysis’ point of view. Fritz and von Schnurbein (2015) de-
fined MI as an umbrella term that may or may not include different existing investment 
strategies such as SRI, impact investing, venture philanthropy, and program-related in-
vestments. Therefore, they also subsume impact investing under the term MI based on the 
point of view of an NPO being to sole investor of interest. Wood et al. (2013) on the oth-
er hand presented different strategic applications of impact investing. One of these appli-
cations is MI, which is the same finding, just from the perspective of impact investing as 
a strategy that can be applied by different types of investors. 
Concluding Discussion and Outlook 
Given their mission-orientation and instrumental usage of financial means NPOs can be 
perceived as mission- and therefore impact-driven investors. Although they profit from 
high financial returns, the mission-related impact created while assets are invested must 
not be neglected. Our analysis of the proposition of sin stocks being an optimal invest-
ment strategy demonstrated that this is only true from an asset-only optic. Under perfect 
condition this may be a suitable financial hedging strategy. However, the exclusion of the 
organization’s mission as a central point of reverence for the evaluation of risk and per-
formance leads to a misperception of desirability. Given our formalization the maximiza-
tion of desirability is only possible under consideration of the organization’s mission. 
Therefore, NPOs as mission-driven investors should also aim at high expected values of 
impact and low values of variance of said impact. As there may also be a covariance be-
tween the financial investment return and the mission-based impact, this relation has to 
be taken into account as well. The inclusion of the organization’s mission into financial 
decision-making among NPOs (and specifically private foundations) is what is known as 
mission investing. Instead of investing into sin stocks, the desirability of a given invest-
ment portfolio can be better increased by applying strategies such as socially responsible 
investing and impact investing. NPOs therefore present an ideal type of a socially respon-
sible and impact investor, as such strategies are often underestimated in their desirability 
by regular investors when adopting an asset-only optic. In order to evaluate the absolute 
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desirability of any given investment strategy and conduct a sound trade-off analysis, 
NPOs are required to construct a mission-neutral benchmark. Only comparing the portfo-
lios net impact together with potential loss or gains of expected financial return and vari-
ance allow for a sound and holistic financial decision-making. The construction of a mis-
sion-neutral benchmark must be based on the organization’s perception of its own pur-
pose and will therefore differ across the NPO sector, and even within certain fields of 
activity. 
The model and formalization presented in this article will supply NPOs with a tool 
that allows assessing the desirability of their investments in more a holistic way. Howev-
er, as simple as the presented model may be, the more complex the calculation of the ac-
tual qualitative impact multiplier γ will be. Empirical testing of this model will give fur-
ther insights into whether there exists a trade-off between mission-specific impact and 
financial return and variance and if such a trade-off differs across different fields of activ-
ity. Given the difficulty of objectively constructing and quantifying an investment’s pur-
pose-related impact we like to stress, that such an analysis will always stay somehow 
imprecise. Also, future research should look into if there is the need not only for the for-
mulation of impact-related measures of risk and return but also risk tolerance. Especially, 
NPOs may display different levels of risk tolerance depending on whether it concerns 
financial or mission-related risks. Although the model we present in our analysis is based 
on simple assumptions and therefore has its limitations it provides a basis for a sound 
analysis for the economic trade-offs an NPO faces. Following our theoretic arguments we 
hence conclude that it is crucial for NPOs to conduct such trade-off analysis, as only un-
der inclusion of the organization’s mission, an economically effective use of tax-exempt 
funds can be achieved. 
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